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ABSTRACT
There is perhaps no other actor within our legal system that shares more power and
control over the carceral state than the American prosecutor. This thesis examines the powers of
the prosecutor at every stage of criminal procedure, how these powers contribute to the carceral
state, and how prioritizing prosecutorial policy reform can effectively reduce persistent mass
incarceration in the United States. This thesis uses three criteria- effectiveness at reducing
overincarceration, feasibility of implementation, and ethical impact- to critically evaluate several
proposals for addressing prosecutorial power and discretion. Ultimately, the thesis recommends a
combination of three proposals for a more amplified effect: restricting the Federal Joinder of
charges, expanding the provisions of Brady v. Maryland to be upheld in plea negotiations, and
eliminating the cash bail system of pretrial detention.
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CHAPTER 1: PROBLEM
Between 1990 and 2005, a new prison opened in the United States every ten days. Prison
growth and the resulting “prison-industrial complex”—the business interests that capitalize
on prison construction—made imprisonment so profitable that millions of dollars were spent
lobbying state legislators to keep expanding the use of incarceration to respond to just about
any problem. Incarceration became the answer to everything—health care problems like
drug addiction, poverty that had led someone to write a bad check, child behavioral
disorders, managing the mentally disabled poor, even immigration issues generated
responses from legislators that involved sending people to prison. Never before had so much
lobbying money been spent to expand America’s prison population, block sentencing
reforms, create new crime categories, and sustain the fear and anger that fuel mass
incarceration than during the last twenty-five years in the United States.
-Bryan Stevenson, Just Mercy (Stevenson, 2015, p. 260)

Understanding Mass Incarceration
Incarceration, by definition, encompasses a state of imprisonment or the state of being
confined. Mass incarceration, however, refers to the rate of imprisonment and a size of prison
population that, as New York University sociology professor David Garland explains, is
“markedly above historical and comparative norms for societies of this type” (Garland, 2001, p.
5). The United States of America not only meets the criteria of mass incarceration or mass
imprisonment, but far exceeds the incarceration norms of any other society, not just comparable
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societies of its type. The United States of America leads the world in incarceration rates while
only accounting for four percent of the world’s total population (Collier, 2014). According to the
World Population Review, as of 2021, the U.S. is home to twenty-five percent of the world’s
total incarcerated population (World Population Review, 2021).
To better put mass incarceration into perspective, out of the entire global prison
population, the United States is responsible for incarcerating one in every four of those prisoners.
The global incarceration average rests at 155 persons per 100,000 of the population (World
Population Review, 2021). The U.S. incarceration average is almost five times that of the global
average, at 639 per 100,000 of the population (World Prison Brief, 2021). In March 2020 alone,
2.3 million individuals were behind bars in the United States (Wagner & Sawyer, 2020). To fully
understand how or why the United States imprisons more individuals, per capita, than any other
country in the world, one must first understand the scope of the American carceral state.
The American carceral state encompasses the breakdown of carceral facilities, at each
level of government, as well as a plethora of criminal offenses that led to incarceration in the first
place. The carceral state is comprised mainly of federal and state prisons. State prisons actually
house the majority of the nation’s prisoners at 1.2 million as of 2020 (Wagner & Sawyer, 2020).
State and local jails are another form of carceral facilities that house lower-level criminals.
According to a report by the Prison Policy Initiative in March 2020, over 600,000 individuals
were being confined in a local jail. Of those 600,000, over 470,000 of those had not been
convicted of a crime (Wagner & Sawyer, 2020). Aside from prisons and jails, there are lesserknown facilities like territorial prisons and immigration detention centers that house prisoners as
well. Together, these two facilities only account for about 53,000 total prisoners, but still
contribute to the carceral state (Wagner & Sawyer, 2020). Juvenile correctional facilities and
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detention centers are yet another form of carceral facility housing minors. All individuals who
are being held in any one of these facilities are included in the total prison population. Beyond
the facilities themselves, there are a multitude of reasons any one American is behind bars
ranging from violent crimes to nonviolent offenses, murder and manslaughter to drug possession,
property crimes to public order violations. All of these various facilities, offenders and reasons
for incarceration together form the carceral state. The American carceral state is vast and
complex in nature but understanding the many contributing factors to our current prison
population is paramount in fully understanding the phenomenon that is mass incarceration.
Mass incarceration in the United States has become increasingly problematic in recent
decades and for many reasons. One of these reasons is the fact that incarceration increases at a
rate that far outpaces both U.S. population growth and crime rates. The percentage of annual
population growth in the U.S. steadily declined after 1991, before hitting an 80-year low in 2018
at a rate of just 0.62 percent (Frey, 2018). All the while, we see incarceration rates increase
upwards of 100 percent from a similar period of time between 1990 and 2012 (U.S. Department
of Justice, 2013). Further, since 1970, a time when the total incarcerated population was just
197,245, incarceration has increased by 700 percent (Ghandnoosh, 2020). Now, at 2.3 million
prisoners, the U.S. prison population is eleven times that of 1970.
According to Figure 1, during this same time period of incarceration growth, both violent
and property crime rates dropped on average, and fairly dramatically, after the 1990s. When
incarceration rates in any country exceed crime rates by more than 250 percent, there is an
argument to be made that the country has an overincarceration problem.
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FIGURE 1: Changes in Crime and Incarceration Rates, (Mitchell & Leachman, 2014).

Aside from outpacing U.S. population growth, violent crime rates, and property crime
rates, mass incarceration remains problematic for financial reasons. A sudden boom in the prison
population led to significantly more resources being spent on corrections in the last four decades.
In 2017, the Prison Policy Initiative released a report, “Following the Money of Mass
Incarceration.” It found that mass incarceration costs the U.S. government and families of those
incarcerated at least $182 billion every year (Wagner and Rabuy, 2017). This number
encompasses not just operational costs of carceral facilities as most studies do, but a
comprehensive list of all costs related to our current system of mass incarceration. It is the first
report of its kind to include parole, probation, legal and judicial costs, prosecution, policing, food
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and utilities, bail fees and costs to families as well as private corrections and private prison
profits to provide a complete cost of mass incarceration. Peter Wagner, co-author of the report,
explains that the study shows just “how wide and how deep mass incarceration and overcriminalization have spread into our economy” and ultimately concludes that state, not federal,
government spending makes up the majority of all correctional spending (Wagner and Rabuy,
2017). Mass incarceration places a heavy financial strain on every level of government, but the
states are overwhelmingly paying the highest price.
Equally as problematic as the financial burden, especially on state budgets, is the social
burden of mass incarceration. For instance, the social burden of incarceration is not dispersed
equally across all segments of the American population, raising another problem. Incarceration
rates remain highly concentrated on marginalized and poor communities across the country.
According to a 2016 report by the Scholars Strategy Network, “one of every 15 black men is
held in jail or state or federal prison, compared to one of every 106 white males. This racial
disparity has a big impact on the life fortunes of white and black men contributing to gaps in
many domains, ranging from jobs and family life to health and mortality” (Lee, McCormick,
Hicken and Wildeman, 2016). The racial disparities of mass incarceration extend beyond the
trends and statistics of imprisonment alone. There is a longstanding history of systemic racism
within our criminal justice system that transcends every aspect of the system from policing to
prosecution, from pretrial processes to the terms of release, and from sentencing outcomes to
reentry programs. Every aspect of incarceration disproportionately affects African Americans in
poor and marginalized communities, meaning overincarceration is not just problematic because
of the number of people imprisoned each year, but the concentration of those being incarceratedthe number of people imprisoned each year belonging to a certain group.
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The problem of mass incarceration persists even while population growth and crime rates
fall. State and federal budgets scramble to afford the rising costs of the current carceral state.
Further, racial and social inequalities heighten as yet another direct result of incarceration trends.
With these resulting complications, it is important to understand how we got to this point. There
are several potential causes of mass incarceration including the war on drugs, the 1994 Crime
Bill, introduction of mandatory minimums and stricter sentencing efforts, contracting of private
prisons and more. However, there remains strong disagreement among scholars on which of
these truly caused mass incarceration, or whether or not it is actually a combination of some or
all of these contributing factors. It is important to look at each of them briefly to understand how
they have contributed over time to our current incarceration rate and if they have been ruled out
as a primary mover of mass incarceration.
What Drives Incarceration?
The sudden jump in incarceration rates first began around the 1970s under the Nixon
Administration. President Nixon was the first to publicly push for an increase in punitive policies
and incarceration when he declared a “War on Drugs” in June 1971 (Perry, 2019). The infamous
war on drugs began as a government-led initiative to end illegal drug use by dramatically
increasing the legal consequences for drug possession, distribution and use. These policies led to
longer prison sentences and undeniably targeted communities of color at disproportionate rates.
There are many aspects of the movement that continue to evolve today including the “tough on
crime” narrative that developed as a result of the war on drugs. This mindset influenced a trend
of bipartisan support for adopting harsher prison policies at the federal and state level and were
highly effective when combined with concerns of public safety and fear tactics and, of course,
masked a strong racial rhetoric. Many point to the war on drugs as the primary mover of
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incarceration including economist and scholar, Jonathan Rothwell (Rothwell, 2014). Senator
Cory Booker and attorney and author of The New Jim Crow, Michelle Alexander, also support
the idea that the war on drugs is a primary mover of mass incarceration. However, the numbers
say otherwise.
Drug charges account for only one in five current prisoners (Sawyer and Wagner, 2020).
Eighty percent of the total incarcerated population whether it be state, local or federal level are
incarcerated for something other than drug possession, trafficking, distribution or use (Sawyer
and Wagner, 2020). There is no denying the war on drugs increased policing efforts and
ultimately increased drug convictions across the country, but the increase in drug convictions in
the 1970s and 1980s does not work to explain the fact that currently, the majority of our nation’s
prisoners, four in every five, are held in carceral facilities on non-drug related charges. There is
very little evidence to suggest that the war on drugs alone is a primary cause of mass
incarceration, or even that reversing its effect would somehow bring the prison population to a
controllable level. Vincent Chiao notably makes the case that while reversing or ending the war
on drugs would not lower incarceration rates to controllable numbers or even to an imprisonment
level similar of comparator countries, it can possibly matter to incarceration rates in a more
indirect way. Chiao argues, “it may be that the war on drugs has given a large number of people
criminal records, resulting in longer sentences for subsequent, non- drug offenses”... “Or it is
possible that the war on drugs has made drug markets more dangerous, and hence more
criminogenic” (Chiao, 2017, p.12). This argument explains the significance of the war on drugs
in terms of its continued implications on U.S. imprisonment, while also acknowledging that the
war on drugs did not work to directly cause current mass incarceration. It is clear that drug
related incarcerations are far outpaced and overshadowed by increases in both violent crime
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incarcerations and property crime incarcerations. Meaning, the war on drugs certainly
contributed to incarceration but it fails to explain the level of growth and mass incarceration we
see today.
Look to New York state, for example. In the last decade, the state has worked to
dramatically decrease the number of inmates serving time for drug related offenses. New York
successfully decreased their incarcerated jail population by around 50 percent according to a
2016 study. “From 1996 to 2016, there was a 73 percent decline in the number of people
incarcerated in New York City’s jails for drug offenses, which made up more than half (52
percent) of the entire jail population decline during that time period” (Greene and Shiraldi, 2016,
p. 32). Even so, the decrease in drug convictions, no matter how drastic, has not been enough to
deny the fact of persistent mass incarceration across the state of New York. It is hard to suggest
the war on drugs could be a leading cause of overincarceration when states like New York can
reverse the effects of the war on drugs and still experience incarceration rates that are historically
and comparatively too high and too costly to control.
Following the Nixon Administration, Ronald Reagan took office and further enforced the
“tough on crime” narrative through sentencing efforts and introducing mandatory minimums.
While the prison population initially began to grow rapidly under the Nixon Administration and
his war on drugs, U.S. incarceration rates truly exploded in the 1980s under President Ronald
Reagan. President Reagan took office in 1981, at a time when the total U.S. prison population
was just over 320,000 (Cullen, 2018). Reagan shared similar policies as Nixon, adopting a tough
on crime narrative that would soon lead to harsher prison policies being implemented and stricter
sentencing measures being passed at every level of government. After his two terms in office,
Reagan left the presidency with 630,000 Americans behind bars (Cullen 2018). The prison
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population essentially doubled under the Reagan Administration, and it was at this point in
history that the American carceral state truly began to grow uncontrollably.
There are a few reasons for the sudden peak in incarceration during Reagan’s presidency.
The passage of the 1984 Comprehensive Crime Control Act is the primary reason. This
legislation introduced mandatory minimum sentences and also simultaneously eliminated federal
parole efforts. Mandatory minimums by definition serve to automatically require a minimum
prison term for certain crimes, often drug crimes. An important aspect of mandatory minimums
is that they are set by Congress, not judges, and a judge does not have the power to overturn or
lessen the prison sentence.

While mandatory minimums have undeniably worked to increase sentencing and
contribute to the current overincarceration problem, there is not enough evidence to suggest that
it has been the primary mover of mass incarceration. This is largely due to the fact that
mandatory minimums typically only apply to drug and gun crimes (Sentencing and mandatory
minimums, 2019). Drug crimes, even when paired with gun crimes, do not account for the
majority of those in prison. In state prisons, the total number of prisoners serving time for a drug
crime is 190,000, and those serving time for a weapons crime is 55,000 (Sawyer and Wagner,
2020). With 2.3 million incarcerated, we see that again, the numbers are not there at the state
level, much less the federal level where drug crimes carrying mandatory minimums make up an
even smaller amount of the total incarcerated population at just 78,000 prisoners (Swayer and
Wagner, 2020). This is not to say that mandatory minimums have not contributed to the
persistence of mass incarceration. Indeed, they have. However, mandatory minimums alone are
not the leading contributing factor to overincarceration.
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Following the War on Drugs and stricter sentencing legislation of the 1980s,
incarceration rates continued to climb at both the federal and state levels throughout the 1990s.
In 1990, the prison population reached a record high of 771,243 (Cohen, 1995). In 1994, the
Violent Crime Control Act and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, known widely as the 1994 Crime
Bill, passed. This legislation not only allowed states to pass even stricter sentencing laws and
build more prisons to better accommodate the growing incarceration numbers, but financially
incentivized these actions through large infusions of federal funding (CRS, 2016). The result was
a substantial increase in the quantity of prison sentences and the lengths of those sentences in
every state, while simultaneously decreasing the number of prisoners qualifying for early release.
Following the passage of the Crime Bill, the total U.S. incarceration rates exploded. In 1995, the
prison population surpassed the one million threshold and reached 1,381,892 by year-end 2000
(Beck and Harrison, 2001). In just one decade, the incarcerated population nearly doubled.
The 1994 Crime Bill has been well documented as a policy failure with aspects of the
legislation being deemed a “terrible mistake” (Johnson, 2014). The Crime Bill has been
considered an accelerator of mass incarceration. Over time, states have come to the realization of
those “terrible” mistakes and have resorted to reversing its effects accordingly. Texas, for
example, has begun to reverse the 1994 Crime Bill in an effort to better contain their
incarceration rates and decrease spending on prisons. In 2007, Texas passed legislation that
reduced mandatory minimums and increased parole efforts while also expanding their drug
courts and closing prisons (Criminal Justice Reform in Texas, 2021). In 2020, Texas also
announced their plan to close two additional state prisons. Other states have followed, scaling
back the scope and severity of mandatory minimum sentencing, resulting in lower prison
populations. Even with the recent changes and policy reversals across the state, however, Texas’
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incarceration rate is currently 520 per 100,000 residents. This is a decrease since 2018, but
nevertheless, the state of Texas still incarcerates about five times more prisoners than the global
rate of incarceration at just 155 per 100,000 (World Population Review, 2021). Again, we see
that while reducing the effects of the war on drugs or even scaling back sentencing and prison
policies of the 1990s can immediately reduce the prison population, it cannot do so to the extent
that would truly change the fact of persistent overincarceration rates. This is especially true on
the state level where incarceration rates are highest.
A final proposed cause of mass incarceration is the contracting of private prisons. Private
prisons emerged as an alternative to prison overcrowding and the increasing burden on the
government to run and regulate prisons. Private prisons, in theory, would work to take the
burdens off of government and put it instead onto private companies. Private prisons became
increasingly popular in the last two decades, with the U.S. private prison population reaching its
peak in 2012 (Gotsch and Basti, 2018). Private prisons have remained a popular alternative in
states experiencing prison overcrowding and overwhelming spending on corrections.
The problem with private prisons is that when states turn to these contracts as a solution,
more inmates are incarcerated and the lengths of sentences increase (Weybright, 2020). Private
prisons are poorly run, with little to no security measures or safety concerns and plagued by
corruption (Austin & Coventry, 2001). They have introduced more issues than they have solved
and aided in our current prison population. Private prisons are not the driver of mass
incarceration. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, eight percent of all people
imprisoned in the United States are housed in private prisons, and twenty-one states do not
currently incarcerate anyone in private facilities (Muhitch & Ghandnoosh, 2021). The federal
level relies on private prisons much more than states do. Even so, at the federal level in 2017, the
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population of those housed in a private facility had decreased by 19 percent (Gotsch, 2019).
Private prisons do not have enough control over the total prison population numbers to be
considered a primary contributor of overincarceration.
The Role of the Prosecutor in Overincarceration
There remains heavy disagreement among scholars on the driver of overincarceration.
The disagreement is not over the primary driver alone, but also the contributing factor that can
best explain how incarceration rates can consistently and steadily increase over time, as crime
rates, drug charges, private prison populations and mandatory minimums simultaneously
decrease. Mass incarceration cannot be explained by these factors alone, contrary to longstanding
popular opinion. While there is a clear parallel of increasingly strict policing and sentencing
policies and the progression of the incarceration rate across four decades, there is still a missing
piece of the puzzle that works to fill the gaps.
It has long been assumed that America’s overincarceration problem has been primarily
driven “by increased drug arrests, draconian sentencing, and the growth of a prison industry”
(Baughman & Wright, 2020, p.1). There is a contributing factor to mass incarceration that is not
the war on drugs, or the Crime Bill, mandatory minimums or private prisons. Though, it is not
completely unrelated to these factors, either. There are many scholars who have overlooked the
one actor that has consistently contributed not only to the number of Americans entering the
prison system each year, but the length of their sentences and terms of their release as well.
Among the major players of our criminal justice system, including legislators, judges, police, and
prosecutors, the role of the American prosecutor has long been “shrouded in mystery”
(Baughman &Wright, 2020). The American prosecutor has overwhelming power and discretion
over the judicial system, responsible for all matters for the adjudication of criminals including
12

investigations, the litigation process, appeals and sentencing. With seemingly unlimited
discretion over the criminal justice process, the American prosecutor works to fill many of the
unanswered gaps in overincarceration trends. Perhaps it is the power and discretion of the
American prosecutor that is, and has been, the driving accelerator of mass incarceration in the
United States.
This explanation is further solidified by the rising popularity of the prosecutor throughout
history. This works to explain the paradox of rising incarceration rates during a period of
historically low crime rates in the United States. Between the 1970s and 1990, violent crime
increased by 100 percent (Eisen, 2015). This is cited over and over again in research regarding
mass incarceration. Usually, though, it is cited as it relates to debunking the war on drugs or
studying crime rates as a driver of incarceration. Rarely, if ever, is it used to explain the
increasing presence of prosecutors. In response to growing violent crime, the number of
prosecutors in the United States simultaneously increased by over fifty percent from 1990-2007
(Gopnik, 2017). The rising popularity of prosecutors as a job prospect was fueled by the crime
surge during the sixties to nineties, but most of these new prosecutors finally took office during a
time of significantly less crime following year-end 1990. By the early 2000s, the U.S. total
violent crime rate began to fall dramatically and has consistently declined every year for the past
twenty years. Author and scholar John Pfaff suggests that their expansion of power has allowed
prosecutors to remain tough on crime even throughout periods of historically and relatively low
crime (Pfaff, 2017).
It is easy to understand how a prosecutor could gain such power when you learn that our
criminal justice system lacks meaningful accountability measures over the prosecutor. This
unchecked power has led to a current justice system that, rather than granting the defendant his
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or her constitutional right to due process and a trial by jury, would rather coerce some ninety-five
percent of all defendants into a plea deal (Devers, 2011). After all, the prosecutor has the power
to bargain a possible life sentence into a parole deal. The reality of our criminal justice system is
that almost every person sitting in a carceral facility today, all 2.3 million of them, are there not
because their trial by jury ended in a conviction and not because they were found guilty of a
crime, but because somewhere in America, a prosecutor convinced them to sign a piece of paper
behind closed doors rather than step foot in a courtroom for a fair trial.
Mass incarceration persists today as a result of a four-decade long policy shift
transcending national, state and local levels. To truly reverse mass incarceration and its longterm effects will require a change within the U.S. criminal justice system that can have an impact
just as far-reaching. While there are other causes of overincarceration to be acknowledged and
addressed, there is no other actor within our criminal justice system who shares the same scope
of power and discretion over the carceral state more so than the American prosecutor. For this
reason, implementing a system of consistency and accountability over prosecutorial power must
be prioritized in order to sustainably and consistently limit overincarceration at every level of the
American justice system. This is not to discredit the effects of other policy reforms, such as
reversing the war on drugs, but rather to explain why the priority in policy reform should instead
be shifted to the role of the American prosecutor: they yield more power and control over the
criminal legal system and the carceral state than any other actor of mass incarceration.
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CHAPTER 2: POWERS OF THE PROSECUTOR
In 1992, Raymond Tempest was sentenced to 85 years in prison for a second-degree
murder conviction (Innocence Project, 2017). At trial, there were no eye-witnesses. There was no
physical evidence connecting him to the crime at all. Yet, Tempest was convicted on the basis of
four faulty witness testimonies, and sentenced to 85 years in prison (Innocence Project, 2017).
He maintained his innocence until 2015 when a Rhode Island judge overturned his original
conviction (Innocence Project, 2017). The New England Innocence Project agreed to take on his
case, revealing several pieces of evidence the prosecutor hid from the defense (Innocence
Project, 2017). After 24 years of incarceration, Raymond Tempest regained his freedom.
In our current justice system, prosecutors yield enough power to violate a defendant’s
constitutional rights, instruct witnesses, tamper with statements, refuse to turn over exculpatory
evidence and conceal key details in a case with little to no oversight or repercussions. Tempest is
not the first innocent man to be wrongfully incarcerated in a United States facility at the hands of
prosecutorial misconduct and until prosecutorial reform is prioritized, he will not be the last. To
fully understand how the American prosecutor contributes to mass incarceration, one must first
understand their power and discretion within our justice system. This chapter will outline the
powers of the prosecutor and the various ways in which each power contributes to the carceral
state.
Prosecutorial discretion is the longstanding authority belonging to the agency responsible
for enforcing the law, and granted in an effort “to decide where to focus its resources and
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whether, or how, to enforce, or not to enforce, the law against an individual” (“Prosecutorial
Discretion and the ICE Office of the Principal Legal Advisor,” n.d.). American prosecutors have
immense power to make all of the crucial decisions in a criminal court case from start to finish,
covering investigation proceedings, indictments and sentencing. The decisions of prosecutors are
exercised often without guidance or meaningful standards of accountability, which produces
several of the inconsistencies of our criminal justice system. While the powers of an American
prosecutor are seemingly limitless, they lie within the bounds of the law. The roles and duties of
the American prosecutor can best be divided into three phases of criminal procedure: pretrial,
trial and posttrial powers. Each stage of trial power builds on the next, with subsequent
implications on incarceration further increasing. Indeed, across pretrial, trial and posttrial
powers, the decisions and unchecked discretion of U.S. prosecutors directly determine the rate of
U.S. imprisonment.

I. Pretrial Powers
Pretrial powers of the prosecutor include first and foremost the decision of whether or not
to charge an individual for a crime. Prosecutors then have complete discretion of what that
charge should be, as well as how many charges should be stacked. Charge-bargaining and bail
are the two other prosecutorial powers exercised before trial, all of which directly contribute to
rates and patterns of imprisonment in their own way.
Charging
The American prosecutor has full power to determine whether or not to charge an
individual with a crime. A prosecutor decides if charges will be filed and what charges will be
filed once they first receive a case file for review after an arrest is made (Konecky, n.d.). The
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decision to charge is made based primarily on the information, or evidence, gathered by police
and provided in this file. Typically, this initial case file will consist of a police report and a
probable cause affidavit (Konecky, n.d.). The prosecutor is tasked with evaluating the case,
examining the sufficiency of the evidence, strength of the case, and expected cooperation of
witnesses and victims (Pirius, n.d.). Prosecutors are also able to access and consider a suspect’s
prior criminal record and arrest history to influence their decision. At this time, American
prosecutors execute their prosecutorial discretion in determining if filing an official complaint, or
charge, in the case before them would be the best use of public resources.
In some cases, a prosecutor determines there is insufficient evidence to move forward
with filing a complaint, or they choose to focus their resources on certain crimes over others,
usually dismissing low-level misdemeanors. For example, newly elected Los Angeles District
Attorney, George Gascón, conducted a series of misdemeanor charging reforms in 2020, issuing
a list of crimes for which all prosecutors in his office should choose to drop or decline before
arraignment including trespass, public intoxication, and disturbing the peace (Special Directive
20-07, 2020). In Louisiana, the New Orleans District Attorney’s office recently adopted a policy
to not prosecute for small amounts of drugs. In April of 2021, Bob White, the District Attorney’s
first assistant, confirmed the policy was in effect and implemented in an effort to “keep the court
docket clear of minor offenses to ensure that we focus on serious crimes impacting our
neighborhoods” (Chrastil, 2021). The decision of District Attorneys and prosecutors not to
prosecute for specific crimes and focus resources on higher-level violent crimes is working
within the bounds of the law and well within their pretrial power to do so. If a prosecutor does
decide to file a charge, however, and proceed with a trial, they also hold the power to drop those
charges at any point during the court proceedings.
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Charging powers have both direct and indirect implications for mass imprisonment. The
initial decision to charge is often motivated by implicit biases. For example, African Americans
are charged more frequently than whites for the same crime. In a recent study comparing black
and white offenders in New Haven, CT, results show significant charging discrepancies among
demographics for the same crimes. Indeed, black offenders were found to be 27% more likely to
be charged with drug sales or possession than white offenders at only 4% (Rosenberg, 2016).
The findings in this study are limited to a small population in just one U.S. city. Nevertheless,
they point to dangerous pretrial charging patterns of prosecutors. The charging power indirectly
impacts incarceration because the decision to charge then determines how many can be stacked
as well as determining the subsequent, appropriate sanctions for each charge. Further, the racial
discrepancies within our prison system start with the arbitrary charging patterns outlined above.
While racial discrimination is only one aspect of the overall mass incarceration problem, it
remains necessary to point out that prosecutors are more likely to bring charges against certain
groups due to their own implicit biases, and notably, without these biases there would be fewer
incarcerations. Ultimately, the significance of the pretrial power to charge on subsequent rates of
incarceration cannot be overstated.
Charge-Bargaining
Once the decision of whether or not to charge is made, the prosecutor must determine
what charges will be filed, and how many. The true scope of the American prosecutor’s pretrial
power is in their ability to strategize which charges will increase the likelihood of a conviction in
trial. Even if a conviction seems unattainable, prosecutors will focus on the charges that, at
minimum, will lead to a guilty plea. This strategy is known as charge-bargaining. As one study
from Columbia Law Review suggests, the scope of the charging powers of a prosecutor lies in
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their ability to employ three tactics: piling on, overreaching, and sliding down. Their pretrial
power is best measured by answering the following procedural questions (Crespo, 2018):
•

With respect to piling on, how many charges can a prosecutor threaten and how
much will each additional charge increase the defendant’s sentencing exposure?

•

With respect to overreaching, what standards must be satisfied before
substantively inflated charges can proceed beyond the filing stage, and how will
those standards be enforced ?

•

With respect to sliding down, what restrictions, if any, will be placed on the
prosecutor’s ability to replace one set of charges with another?

Figure 2 identifies these three components of prosecutorial charge-bargaining power, the law that
regulates these powers, and the mechanism by which prosecutors execute these powers (Crespo,
2018).
FIGURE 2: Components of the Charge Bargaining Process, (Crespo, 2018)
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‘Piling On’ refers to the mechanism of inflating the quantity of charges presented against
a defendant in such a way that often duplicates identical charges to increase the likelihood of a
guilty plea. Overreaching involves yet another manipulative practice of prosecutors in which
they can choose to inflate the substance of the charges themselves in a way that extends beyond
evidence provided, or the grounds of the case support, thereby overreaching the bounds of the
law (Crespo, 2018). Finally, sliding down refers to the power prosecutors hold in deciding to
lessen the charges or threats made so far, ensuing leverage to offer a potential plea before trials
can take place (Crespo, 2018). All of these charge-bargaining powers are employed through
pretrial decision making. While overreaching at its core aims to test the scope and boundaries of
the law, ultimately, American prosecutors employ these three tactics within the bounds of the
law and their pretrial powers to do so.
In terms of incarceration, the power to inflate the number of charges brought against a
defendant directly increases the prison sentences that will later be sanctioned against them. This
not only increases the number of sentences, but their lengths as well. While not every charge
results in imprisonment, charge-bargaining plays an important role in those that do. The
incentive for prosecutors to inflate charges leads to an increasing number of sentences sanctioned
and extends the amount of prison time served for all sentences.
Bail
A final and lesser-known pretrial power of the American prosecutor is their ability to
request to set or deny bail. While the final decision-making power to determine bail belongs to
the judge, prosecutors have the power to request that bail be set or denied in their criminal cases
at an initial bail hearing. Bail and pretrial release within the U.S. criminal justice system plays a
significant role in overincarceration, yet has remained largely understudied and overlooked as it
20

relates to prosecutorial power. In 2019, graduate student Katherine Hood and assistant professor
of sociology at the University of California, Berkeley, Daniel Schneider, conducted a study to
examine bail and pretrial release practices in popular U.S. jurisdictions. Their study determined
that defendants currently being held in pretrial detention because of monetary bail decisions
make up twenty percent of the total current U.S. incarcerated population (Hood & Schneider,
2019).
With two of every three jailed individuals being held on bail and not yet convicted of a
crime, it is important to understand the power and motivation of prosecutors in requesting bail
(Minton and Zeng, 2015). Detention before trial can be a significant bargaining tool for
prosecutors, so they often fight for a heavy bail to be set by the judge. A 2017 study in the Utah
Law Digital Commons, “The Bail Book: A Comprehensive Look at Bail in America's Criminal
Justice System,” explored the bargaining power of the prosecutor as it relates to bail requests,
ultimately finding that American prosecutors know that any kind of detention before trial will
only increase the likelihood that a defendant takes a plea deal (Baughman, 2017). This study
explains, “prosecutors have an incentive to ask for high bails to ensure that defendants will
remain behind bars” (Baughman, 2017, p.7). The role of prosecutors in requesting bail is heavily
influenced by the likelihood of a conviction. When bail determines pretrial detention, which in
turn increases the likelihood of a guilty plea or criminal conviction, prosecutors have a direct
motive to request that monetary bail be set in those pretrial bail hearings (Baughman, 2017).
Further, they not only request bail be set by the judge, but request it be set at a high monetary
value, increasing their coercive power for trial (Baughman, 2017).
Because individuals being held on bail are housed in carceral facilities such as jail, they
contribute to total incarceration rates. Also, a defendant’s pretrial detention only hurts their fair
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trial chances (Baughman, 2017). Pretrial detention works to increase the likelihood of accepting
a guilty plea deal from the prosecutor regardless of guilt (Baughman, 2017).

II. Trial Powers
After the arrest, case filing, indictment, bail hearing and the prosecutor’s decision to
make an official charge, the trial proceedings begin or the defendant accepts a plea deal from the
prosecution. If no plea deal is offered or accepted, the defendant will appear in court for an
arraignment, at which point a judge will read the prosecutor’s official charges to be brought
against the defendant in trial (Baldwin, n.d.). The prosecutor’s role in trial proceedings is to
simply bring the case against the accused and win a conviction on behalf of the state. Although
prosecutors are involved from the time of an initial arrest, their primary role in representing the
state and getting a conviction is just beginning after the arraignment hearing. Prosecutors have
immense power in plea deals and over the trial proceedings. These trial powers include their
ability to determine the terms and conditions of the plea deal as well as their oversight and
discretion in the most critical components of any trial by jury: evidence and witness statements.
However, when unchecked, these powers open the door for wrongful convictions of the innocent,
common tactics such as information suppression, and a dangerous loophole known as witness
coaching.
Plea Bargaining
First and foremost, prosecutors hold the power to determine plea deals through a process
known as plea bargaining. Most people assume that the American justice system looks much like
a courtroom, packed with lawyers and a judge, waiting to hear the decision of a jury that has
been given all the relevant facts of a case before them. The reality of the American justice system
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is that for most defendants, their fate is not determined in a courtroom, or by a jury, or even with
the relevant facts of the case. Rather, our justice system works more so like picturing a piece of
paper being signed somewhere in the depths of a courthouse, maybe in a prosecutor’s office, that
determines guilt and allows the defendant to gain a more favorable outcome. Plea bargaining
accounts for the majority of current criminal justice transactions which arguably makes plea
deals “more a part of the American justice system than the formal trial (Subramanian, Digard,
Washington II & Sorage, 2020). Much like pretrial decisions, plea bargaining is decided entirely
by the prosecutor.
The term plea bargaining describes the formal process by which prosecutors secure a deal
with the defendant in which he or she foregoes their constitutional right to trial and decides to
plead guilty to the charges decided by the prosecutor. Often, this is done in exchange for a more
favorable charging or sentencing outcome (Davis, 2009). Almost all criminal cases are resolved
through a guilty plea, controlled entirely by the prosecutor. In 2018, for example, a Pew research
study revealed that of the 80,000 federal prosecutions initiated that year, only two percent went
to trial (Pew Research Center, 2019). More than 97 percent of all federal criminal convictions
were obtained through plea deals alone. Not far behind, upwards of 94 percent of all state
criminal convictions are obtained through plea deals (Yoffe, 2017).
Considering these statistics, it is no surprise that scholars have recently been known to
suggest the American criminal justice system would arguably collapse by a mass refusal to plead
guilty (Subramanian, Digard, Washington II & Sorage, 2020). The full implications of plea
bargaining on our legal system remain unknown, largely due to the fact that it is a complex,
undocumented process that involves multiple parties and considerations that extend beyond the
current data collecting capabilities of our justice system (Subramanian, Digard, Washington II &
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Sorage, 2020, p. iii). “In recent years, mounting concerns about plea bargaining’s role in
encouraging the widespread forfeiture of constitutionally guaranteed trial rights and associated
procedural protections—and its critical role in fueling mass incarceration— has stimulated
further urgency in understanding how the process works” (Subramanian, Digard, Washington II
& Sorage, 2020, p. 4). With an ever present need to understand its implications, plea bargaining
has emerged at the forefront of critical research into arbitrary practices and gaps of our criminal
justice system, exploring why previous studies fail to describe the prosecutorial practices that
influence pleas and also why definitive answers remain difficult to discern (Subramanian,
Digard, Washington II & Sorage, 2020).
At its core, plea deals are the connection between prosecutorial decision-making and
overincarceration, working as an incentive to forfeit procedural justice in an effort to fill carceral
facilities with “guilty” defendants. Prosecutors control the charges a defendant must plead guilty
to, the sentencing they will receive for those charges, and the terms of their release. These
decisions are left entirely to the discretion and coercive powers of the American prosecutor, with
no oversight from any other actor in our justice system. There is perhaps no other aspect within
our justice system in which prosecutors have more power than they do in their role to determine
guilt through plea deals. According to The National Registry of Exonerations, 283 of the
exonerated prisoners since 2016 accepted a plea deal (The National Registry of Exonerations,
2021). Plea bargaining fuels the prison population not only with unnecessary sentencing lengths
but more dangerously, wrongful convictions of the innocent.
Evidence
In the roughly two percent chance that a trial is preferred over a plea deal, prosecutors
enjoy a variety of powers over trial proceedings including the oversight of evidence. Prosecutors
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are expected to “see that all the relevant facts, including those favorable to an accused, are placed
before the court and to present those facts in an ethical, fair, dispassionate, firm and clear
manner” (Mwalili, 1997, p. 223). Evidence is a key player in any trial, necessary for the
determination of guilt or innocence of the defendant.
The guiding principle for prosecutorial discretion over evidence lies in the 1963 Supreme
Court decision of Brady v Maryland. The landmark decision established that prosecutors must
turn over all evidence to the defense that could potentially exonerate the defendant. The Brady
Rule, as it is now known, essentially prevents the government from withholding evidence that is
material in determining guilt. However, given the vague nature of the decision, the Brady Rule
has become what some scholars consider a litigation game. Further, the Brady Rule is so
contradictory that it is an ideal of justice nearly impossible to uphold. “It requires a prosecutor to
balance competing and contradictory objectives, and is so malleable that it affords prosecutors an
extremely broad opportunity to exercise discretion in ways that impede rather than promote the
search for truth” (Gershman, 2007, p.533). Prosecutors use their discretion in determining what
exactly constitutes Brady evidence, and when to disclose this evidence to the defense
(Gershman, 2007).
It is important to note that no federal district enforces any sanction for a prosecutor who
fails to disclose Brady evidence, or discloses it in an untimely manner; but every state
conveniently provides remedies for prosecutorial nondisclosure of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, including that the state may grant a continuance or disallow proof relating to Brady
violations (Gershman, 2007). Another study published by Cynthia Jones states that, “Commonly,
when Brady violations are discovered-even when the violations are intentional and blatant- trial
judges focus on curing any harm suffered by the defendant but fail to take punitive measures
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against the offending prosecutor to deter future Brady violations” (Jones, 2010, p.420). She
concludes that the government’s legal responsibility to share all favorable evidence to the
defense under Brady v Maryland has become one of, if not the, most “unenforceable
constitutional mandates in criminal law” (Jones, 2010).
There are relatively no enforced sanctions for prosecutors who do not uphold Brady. As a
result, prosecutors are incentivized to employ their trial power and discretion to take several
gamesmanship approaches in litigating Brady v Maryland. These approaches include not only
the strategic suppression of information and evidence, but also the legal deception of witness
statements. Brady has created a game of litigating, resulting in increased convictions and often at
the price of violating defendants’ rights and convicting the innocent. The resulting dramatic
increase in convictions, especially wrongful convictions, makes this trial power of the prosecutor
an issue of mass imprisonment.
Witness Statements
The role of witness testimonies and key witness statements can be crucial to the
determination of guilt in any trial. An insidiously popular strategy to undermine Brady in terms
of witness testimony, is the tactic used by prosecutors to make a deal for the state’s key witness
and simultaneously deceive the witness into testifying they have not agreed to a deal.
“Unbeknownst to the judge, the jury, and the witness himself, a prosecutor may make a deal with
a witness's attorney in which the prosecutor agrees to reward the witness for his testimony as
long as the attorney promises not to tell his client about the agreement” (Gershman, 2007). In
using this tactic, the prosecutor can now claim that the witness' testimony is not perjury. Further,
the prosecutor now argues there was no deal made with the witness that would in any way
motivate him to provide impeachable testimony (Gershman, 2007). This strategy keeps key
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witnesses from perjuring themselves because they can honestly testify that they have not made a
deal. However, this scheme is often discovered and as a result, many cases are reported and
appealed. For example, in Hayes v Brown, an appeal was made following the conviction of the
defendant arguing that the witness in the case gave a false testimony and the prosecution had
therefore violated Brady (Gershman, 2007). The Ninth Circuit observed that it “is reprehensible
for the State to seek refuge in the claim that a witness did not commit perjury, when the witness
unknowingly presents false testimony at the behest of the State” (Gershman, 2007). The
conviction was vacated.
Another similar trial power of the prosecutor is their ability to partake in witness
coaching to ensure a conviction at trial. As a 2002 research study, “Witness Coaching by
Prosecutors” states,
Witness coaching has been described as the 'dark’ some have even called it ‘dirty’ secret of
the U.S. adversary system. It is a practice, some claim, that more than anything else has
given trial lawyers a reputation as purveyors of falsehoods. Witnesses are prepared by
lawyers in private, no records are kept, and the participants do not openly discuss the
encounter (Gershman, 2002, p. 829).
There are several concerns surrounding prosecutors’ execution of this tactic including the well
documented error and wrongful convictions that stem from unchecked prosecutorial witness
coaching, as well as a concern for the absence of critical oversight and examination into the
practice itself. The point of witness coaching, as it relates to the role, power and discretion of the
American prosecutor, is to prepare witnesses to give testimonies not to “ascertain, present, and
protect the truth, but rather to manipulate the truth in order to secure a conviction” (Gershman,
2002). Prosecutors hold that preparing witnesses for trial, often with the deliberate objective to
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promote misleading information, can serve to eliminate any discrepancies or inconsistencies
between earlier statements and the current trial testimony, avoid details that could embarrass the
witness, and conceal any and all information that would reveal the prosecution has suppressed
information and thereby violated Brady (Gershman, 2002).
There is nothing wrong, legally, with a prosecutor assisting a witness in his or her trial
testimony when the testimony itself is truthful. In fact, preparing witnesses for trial is a very
necessary role of the American prosecutor and their function in trial. However, not all
prosecutorial witness coaching is done in preparation for an honest and effective testimony. Due
to the scope and unchecked nature of their trial responsibilities, prosecutors often employ
schemes like information suppression and witness coaching, actions and conduct that extend far
beyond their permissible roles (Gershman, 2002). These powers undermine key guiding
principles of the law, such as Brady v Maryland, that would otherwise ensure a fair and honest
trial.
Finally, all of these tactics, when exercised with no standard of accountability lead to
more convictions for the prosecutor, further fueling overincarceration. These gamesmanship
approaches to obtain a conviction possibly incarcerate innocent defendants, posing dangerous
implications for not only the amount of people entering carceral facilities, but the extended
lengths of their sentences and arbitrary reasons for those incarcerations.

III. Post-Trial Powers
For many years, the research focus of prosecutorial power and discretion has been
centered on charging discretion and plea bargains alone. Relatively little attention has been given
to the prosecutor’s role in sentencing and their obligation to ensure justice long after a
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conviction. Their powers do not end at trial. Prosecutors play a significant role in post-trial
decisions such as sentencing guidelines, appeals and parole.
Sentencing
Historically, prosecutors played a very limited role in sentencing efforts, as the judge
held the majority, if not all, of the sentencing power and discretion in criminal cases. Under this
system, which was in place for most of the twentieth century, prosecutors were not required to
speak on or argue for whether or not the sentence was just, and they had relatively no power to
contest a particular sentence on appeal (Simons, 2009). The decision of whether or not the
sentences imposed were “just” was left entirely to the judge. In 1987, the United States system of
federal sentencing changed completely under a newly released, complex set of standards known
as the Sentencing Guidelines (Simons, 2009). These Guidelines allowed prosecutors to argue
sentencing facts and prove Guidelines law, expanding their role in sentencing. In his study
“Prosecutors as Punishment Theorists: Seeking Sentencing Justice,” Michael Simons argues,
“Superficially, this limiting of the prosecutor’s involvement at sentencing made sense and was
consistent with traditional institutional roles: the prosecutor decided the charge, the jury decided
guilt or innocence, and the judge decided the sentence. This division of roles, however, had one
major exception: mandatory sentences” (Simons, 2009, p.4). Directly following the release of
Sentencing Guidelines, the United States Congress introduced mandatory minimums. As
previously acknowledged, mandatory minimums typically were reserved for drug and gun
offences. Under this new system of mandatory minimums, sentencing outcomes were inherently
determined by the charge, directly expanding the prosecutor’s power of charging and charge
bargaining. Prosecutors began to gain more power over sentencing protocols than ever before.
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To further complicate the prosecutors’ role in sentencing, the Supreme Court created a
third sentencing measure in 2005 under the decision of United States v Booker. This decision
declared the Sentencing Guidelines to be in violation of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right,
determining that the Sentencing Guidelines should be merely advisory and not mandatory
(Hofer, 2007). Booker introduced the idea that sentencing should be determined by traditional
standards of punishment such as retribution, rehabilitation, and deterrence, and also served to
establish that federal appellate courts would be responsible for determining whether a particular
sentence is reasonable (Simons, 2009). Simmons explains,
“Under this system of advisory guidelines, prosecutors still play the role to which they had
become accustomed—proving sentencing facts and arguing Guidelines law to establish the
appropriate Guidelines range. But prosecutors now also find themselves in the unfamiliar
role of arguing—both at sentencing and on appeal—that a particular sentence is or is not
reasonable. In other words, prosecutors must justify the sentences they seek by reference to
the traditional purposes of punishment” (Simons, 2009, p. 4-5).
Over the last four decades, prosecutorial power and discretion expanded dramatically in the
realm of sentencing. This is due, in part, to the introduction of mandatory minimums in
determining sentences by the prosecutor’s charge alone, and again in 2005 when the prosecutor
was deemed responsible for arguing and determining sentencing justice.
Arguably, sentencing has quickly become the most powerful prosecutorial power in terms
of its relationship to incarceration. The ability of a prosecutor to determine what sentence should
be sanctioned for their charge and decide the length of sentences as well directly determines the
prison population for years to come.
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Appeals
Appeals themselves are handled entirely by the appellate courts. An appeal is not a new
trial and the appellate courts do not hear witness statements or consider new evidence. Rather,
appellate courts review the case and the decision that was made to determine whether or not the
proceedings were fair and just and if proper laws were applied correctly (“About the U.S. Courts
of Appeals”, n.d.). In civil cases, both parties have the right to submit an appeal. While the right
to request an appeal is reserved largely for the defendant in criminal cases, American prosecutors
have the power to appeal in certain cases. The American Bar Association outlines the situations
in which the prosecution can submit an appeal, carefully avoiding the constitutional prohibition
against double jeopardy. Prosecutors are permitted to appeal from orders that dismiss
indictments on substantive grounds, terminate the prosecution on other grounds, or from pretrial
orders granting motions to suppress evidence or have confessions declared inadmissible (ABA
Standards for Criminal Justice, 1980).
An appeal directly determines the likelihood an individual remains incarcerated or can be
released. As such, the influence of the prosecutor in appealing these cases remains significant to
incarceration rates and terms of release.

Parole
Finally, prosecutors exercise their power and discretion in parole proceedings. Parole
decisions are often made in the spotlight, under the scrutiny of the public eye. If a decision is
made to release a defendant, and that defendant re-offends, public backlash and political scrutiny
is sure to ensue. As a result, prosecutors rarely use their power to personally testify at parole
hearings to protect their political careers. However, because their input is often crucial in the

31

decision to release, prosecutors often submit written statements or materials to be used rather
than appearing in person. Michael Cassidy, faculty member at Boston College Law School,
explores the question: What value can the prosecutor’s testimony add to the release
determination? In his 2009 study Cassidy states:
“The nature and the circumstances of the offense are certainly matters known by the
prosecutor and relevant to the parole board’s determination. The more depraved or heinous
the crime, the more likely it may be in the public’s interest to deny release to the prisoner
because such release could both undermine general deterrence and erode public confidence in
the retributive value of the criminal law. Or, the depravity of the crime could speak to
internal motivations or impulses of the prisoner that may be difficult to overcome through
treatment” (Cassidy, 2009, p.298).
Further, there are two factors imperative to a decision of release: the defendant’s expression of
remorse and the likelihood they will re-offend upon release (Cassidy, 2009). Because the
prosecutor not only has this information, but also knows the defendant and case better than any
other member of the parole board, the input of the prosecutor contributes substantial and critical
information to the parole decision. The roles and powers of the prosecutor do not end after a
conviction or acquittal is made. Rather, American prosecutors exercise their power and
discretion throughout the trial and posttrial process. The parole hearing is the final opportunity
for prosecutors to execute their power and discretion in criminal proceedings.
The powers of the prosecutors span throughout the entirety of criminal procedure. At
each stage, the powers and decisions of the prosecutor have lasting implications on the current
incarcerated population, whether that be from charge bargaining in an early stage of the trial
process, plea bargaining during trial, or even sentencing powers post-trial. Prosecutors have
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unchecked powers that fuel not only the numbers and rates of total incarceration but the arbitrary
discrepancies in incarceration patterns as well. This is why addressing prosecutorial power can
provide meaningful policy reform for controlling and limiting America’s overincarceration
problem.
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CHAPTER 3: METHODOLOGY
The ideal solution to address these inconsistencies of our criminal justice system lies in
the intersection of addressing prosecutorial power and simultaneously limiting the carceral state.
To do so, we must first explore proposed policy solutions relating to both addressing the
prosecutor and reducing incarceration. Then, we will need to implement a framework or criteria
to evaluate these policies.
In recent years, there have been several solutions offered to combat the inconsistencies
in prosecutorial power and discretion as it directly relates to overincarceration. Rather than
researching groups or categories of reform, I looked instead for individual policy ideas ultimately
finding eight proposed policy solutions for the problem at hand. The research for finding these
policy proposals consisted of studying think tanks, reading a variety of studies on prosecutorial
power and overincarceration published in law journals, including those from New York
University School of Law and Harvard Law, as well as other books and published research
studies. The decision to explore individual policy proposals rather than broad categories of
reform is due largely to the idea that individual policies are more specific in application, while
general categories of reform are typically so broad in their scope that they would yield more
vague results. These individual solutions range greatly in severity, scope and application. As a
result, this methodology section is aimed at providing an understanding of the framework that
will be used to narrow down these solutions in the following chapter.

34

This methodology is partially guided by the United Nations Environment Program’s
(UNEP) approach to assessment of bottom-up policy effectiveness. This framework identifies
that a policy must phase through a series of indicators, in order, each with one to two intervening
variables. For this research, the indicators the policy must phase through would be effectiveness,
feasibility, then ethics. Effectiveness is the first phase as it has been determined the most
important indicator. If the policy solution is found to be ineffective at solving our problem, there
is no reason for it to be further researched or examined under the remaining factors. For this
reason, determining effectiveness must be the first step in the methodology process followed by
feasibility and ethics. For each indicator, there are two intervening variables that must be
considered. Figure 3 depicts the framework.
FIGURE 3: Guiding Framework

Being guided by the belief that a strong policy proposal should only consist of solutions
that are effective, politically and economically feasible, and ethically sound, I began sifting
through solutions with an initial screening to ensure they were first and foremost, effective. Does
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this solution address the role and power of the prosecutor? Does it reduce overincarceration in a
significant way? Is this solution useful? Depending on the answer, the solutions left will then
advance to the feasibility phase. The feasibility screening explores the political and economic
feasibility of each proposed solution answering the questions: Could this be reasonably
implemented? Who pays? Is that feasible? The remaining solutions, having been deemed
effective and feasible, are then evaluated based on ethics. Who would receive benefits? If only
certain groups, is that just? If or when policies successfully phase through all three indicators,
they will be recommended in following chapters.

Phase 1: Effectiveness
Determining a policy’s effectiveness can be an ambiguous task. For this reason, the two
intervening variables are designed to ensure the policies that process through phase 1 are
effective at reaching our goal. The two indicators for effectiveness include (1) a reasonable limit
of prosecutorial power and discretion and (2) determining if this policy would limit incarceration
in a significant way. There are solutions to control the carceral state that are outside of the role of
the prosecutor, just as there are solutions to address prosecutorial power that have no bearing on
limiting current incarceration rates. Indeed, the solutions I explored and included in this research
had to address both to be considered effective policy solutions.
Reasonable limits on prosecutorial power ensure the policy solutions being examined do
not just limit or control mass imprisonment but also directly relate to the roles of the prosecutor.
Key determinants for this variable are relevance to the prosecutorial powers identified in
previous chapters and accountability measures over their discretion. The term reasonable is
necessary as it works to screen out extreme proposals such as abolishing prosecutorial discretion
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altogether. While problematic when abused or misguided, prosecutorial discretion is important to
the function of our criminal legal system and must be upheld. This measure of effectiveness
works to ensure the policies being examined limit the scope of prosecutorial power in a
reasonable way, discarding severe or extreme proposals and proposals that reduce incarceration
without addressing the powers of the prosecutor.
The second variable or indicator of effectiveness is to determine the limits or reductions
in incarceration rates. To do so, one must look at the number of people being impacted by this
policy: Does it limit the number entering carceral facilities? If not, does it at least limit the
amount of time spent in carceral facilities? If the policy can remove, limit the number of
individuals entering facilities, or reduce the time spent in carceral facilities, then the policy can
reasonably be considered effective at limiting overincarceration. If not, the solution must be
discarded. In terms of limiting incarceration, determining the impact in both the number of
people affected and also in the lengths of their sentences is key to determine this subcategory of
effectiveness. If the policy solutions successfully process through effectiveness, addressing each
intervening variable, they can then be screened for feasibility.
Phase 2: Feasibility
Feasibility is important to policy proposals as this determines the likelihood of a policy
being implemented. If a proposed policy solution can be considered feasible, then the solution is
worth further examining and applying. If it cannot be considered feasible, then the solution must
be discarded as it is unlikely to be implemented. The intervening variables being considered at
this phase include (1) political feasibility and (2) economic feasibility.
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Political feasibility is generally concerned with the likelihood of legislation being passed.
Public opinion and time sensitivity play an important role in determining political feasibility.
How time-sensitive is the proposed solution? Does this increase or decrease the likelihood of
being passed? Further, public opinion is an important measure of political feasibility because it
takes into account the interest of both citizens and legislators. The key measurement is not just
interest, but influence. Even if the proposed solution is not popular among the public, depending
on the probability or degree of influence, it could still be a politically feasible policy. An
unpopular policy needs just one person, figure, or cause to advocate on its behalf and change the
public’s perception. How will the time sensitivity of this policy impact its passage? What is the
overwhelming public opinion on this issue? Can it be influenced? These are the questions that
must be answered to determine the true scope and strength of political feasibility.
Economic feasibility is an important factor for policy proposals as this determines the
likelihood the policy at hand can or will be funded. While cost alone is an important aspect to
feasibility, there are more detailed, economic implications to consider. For example, the question
is not just an issue of how much funding is necessary, but who will pay? Will this policy require
a tax increase? Considering the full cost of the policy and the actor responsible for funding it will
provide a stronger understanding of economic feasibility. Further, a cost benefit analysis could
also be necessary to determine the economic feasibility of each solution. A cost benefit analysis
considers the estimated benefits, or opportunities, of a policy and compares them to the estimated
cost in an effort to determine whether that policy would be feasible from an economic or
business stand point (Stobierski, 2019).
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If a policy cannot be considered both politically and economically feasible it must be
discarded. If, however, the policy solutions can be considered feasible, these solutions will be
further screened for ethics.
Phase 3: Ethics
I have discovered that when exploring and analyzing policies, political feasibility seems
to be the priority. Too often, ethical considerations are not taken into account when considering
the strength of possible solutions. This research now separates itself from the publications these
solutions initially came from by adding an additional consideration that will ultimately
strengthen the final proposed solution(s). The intervening variable for the ethics phase is (1)
examining distributive justice by implementing John Rawls’ Veil of Ignorance.
This ethical framework is designed to address issues of distributive justice. For example,
who would benefit from this policy: everyone, or only certain groups? If certain groups, which
groups and is that just? This is an important consideration because it ensures the benefits of a
policy are directed to those who need it. When benefits or opportunities of a policy proposal are
misdirected in such a way that those who need its benefits most do not receive them, there is an
ethical problem. Overincarceration is not just a practical problem of numbers alone. Solutions
may limit incarceration considerably, but do so in a way that only releases white collar criminals
or individuals of a certain social class. In this case, the solution addresses the numbers, but not
the ethical problem of easing the concentration of poor or minority individuals targeted for
incarceration. Distributive justice matters because it ensures that any changes made to
prosecutorial discretion not only limit incarceration, but do so in an ethical and just way. This
aspect of the methodology ties in a necessary accountability measure for the racial discrepancies
and charging patterns of prosecutors previously discussed in chapter two.
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CHAPTER 4: APPLICATION
Proposed Solutions
As previously mentioned, there are eight policy solutions that have been proposed in an
effort to alleviate the burden of incarceration rates and control prosecutorial power and
discretion. It is important to note that there are several more policy proposals that have been
researched and suggested to reduce incarceration or limit prosecutorial power, but these are the
eight that focus on the two issues together. All solutions are briefly outlined below.
Pretrial Diversion Programs
Addressing prosecutorial reform at the front end of criminal procedure is key to truly
limit overincarceration and the number of individuals entering carceral facilities. For this reason,
one possible solution is for our justice system to shift towards pretrial diversion programs. These
programs place individuals on a justice track that is less punitive and affords opportunities for
rehabilitation. Pretrial diversion programs vary from state to state, but are typically reserved for
non-violent, first-time offenders. Further, these programs are an alternative to incarceration,
protecting participants from any official charges brought against them so long as they
successfully complete the program (United States Department of Justice, 2020). Advantages of
adopting pretrial diversion include reducing recidivism rates, easing the case load burden of
prosecutors, and reducing the number of individuals entering carceral facilities while keeping
communities safe (United States Department of Justice, 2020).
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This solution also saves judicial resources, where necessary, to be focused on violent or
repeat offenders rather than low-level, minor offenders (United States Department of Justice,
2020). Diversion programs would effectively limit incarceration rates while reducing recidivism
and reasonably address the role of the prosecutor by easing case-loads and reallocating the time
and resources to necessary offenders.
Restrict Federal Joinder
The current federal criminal procedure allows for joinder of charges, giving the
prosecutor the power to charge multiple crimes against a single defendant at once. Often, the
weight of the crimes alone is minimal. Together, however, the added charges inflate the
prosecutor’s negotiating power. This tactic is used most often to coerce the defendant into
accepting a guilty plea. As previously explained, this practice of bringing a series of charges
often redundant in nature against a defendant at once is known as charge stacking. Given the
nature of criminalization in the United States, almost any crime on its own will result in multiple
added charges, with each charge carrying its own layer of additional punishment (Gates, 2020).
For example, burglary is a crime possibly carrying a three-year prison sentence, but so is
possession of a burglar’s tools (Gates, 2020). Under the Federal Joinder, both charges can be
brought against a defendant meaning the three-year sentence easily becomes five if possession of
a burglar’s tools carries an additional two years (Gates, 2020). The defendant is now more likely
to take a plea deal as the possible sentence he or she faces has nearly doubled due to the
prosecutor’s power to join charges of same or similar character. Prosecutors often employ charge
stacking not on the basis of addressing all the crimes that took place, but rather for strategically
analyzing the punishment that the additional crimes would carry, reinforcing their power to
coerce and strengthening the likelihood of a guilty plea.
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The current United States Federal Joinder Rule states that a prosecutor has the power to
add additional charges when “the offenses charged … are of the same or similar character, or are
based on the same act or transaction, or are connected with or constitute parts of a common
scheme or plan” (Gates, 2020). The solution in this case would be to limit the quantity of charges
of “same or similar character,” as defined by the current rule, that can be brought against one
defendant in any given trial (Gates, 2020). This reduces the prosecutor’s bargaining power,
limiting the guilty pleas signed. Further, with fewer charge bargaining powers, sentences would
be reduced, lowering not just the potential number of individuals entering carceral facilities, but
possibly reducing their sentence lengths as well.
Independent Review
Shima Baughman, professor of law at the University of Utah, specializes in prosecution,
crime, and bail. In one of her recent studies, “Prosecutors and Mass Incarceration,” she explores
the idea of adding a necessary accountability measure for elected officials – including
prosecutors. This independent review consists of an outside party or entity reviewing charging
patterns of all prosecutors within a district. “We believe that collecting prosecutor charging data
and requiring a regular independent review of prosecutorial decisions could help prosecutors
consider the impact of their charging decisions” (Baughman, 2020, p.65). Charging problems
have an immediate and dramatic effect on incarceration. This biannual review is a possible
policy solution that effectively addresses the central idea of this thesis: adding a necessary
accountability measure over prosecutors and their discretion to limit incarceration.
An independent review could be beneficial in implementing more cautious approaches to
charging patterns for prosecutors. Angela Davis has also called for the establishment of
prosecutorial review boards. Similar to Baughman, Davis explains that these boards would be
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responsible for reviewing decisions of the prosecutors, adding that they should be required to
publish reports after each review specifying the practices or decisions that violate (and comply
with) the American Bar Association (ABA) Prosecution Function Standards (Davis, 2009).
Unlike other solutions, an independent review would ensure elected officials are held
accountable for any irregular or inconsistent charging patterns regardless of their political
motivations to remain tough on crime for re-election purposes.
Expand Brady v. Maryland
In an effort to protect a defendant’s Constitutional rights, Brady v. Maryland was decided
by the Supreme Court of the United States on May 13, 1963. The Brady Rule, as it is now
known, requires prosecutors to disclose materially exculpatory evidence in the government's
possession to the defense during trial (“Brady Rule,” 2017). In 2016, James Grossman explored
the role of Brady in the modern legal era, a time when plea deals have replaced the vast majority
of criminal trials. The Brady Rule is a powerful protection for defendants, but “its reach and
ramifications touch only criminal trials” (Grossman, 2016, p.1528). This means the promise of
Brady goes unanswered in our current justice system due to over ninety percent of criminal
convictions being decided by a guilty plea rather than trial.
Expanding Brady would force prosecutors to protect defendants’ rights by considering
and disclosing exculpatory evidence during the plea bargain process (Grossman, 2016). This
accountability measure could effectively limit the power of the prosecutor while simultaneously
protecting defendants’ Constitutional rights in the era of plea negotiations. Grossman concludes,
“By extending Brady, the Court will ensure that defendants finally receive the constitutional
protections Brady was created to safeguard” (Grossman, 2016, p.1561). In her book, Arbitrary
Justice, Angela Davis reveals that Brady violations are the most common type of prosecutorial
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abuse or “misconduct” (Davis, 2009). Controlling the coercive powers of the prosecutor limits
their ability to plea bargain, and in turn, reduces the likelihood of guilty pleas and harsh
sentencing negotiations that lead to unnecessary incarceration lengths.
Blind Charging
The concept of blind charging has been proposed as a possible solution to alleviate the
racial disparities in incarceration and sentencing. Blind charging is a practice that redacts the
defendant’s race, age, and location of the crime committed with the purpose of ensuring a fair
charge that is not guided by any explicit or implicit biases. A 2013 study by Lisa Stolzenberg
states that, “a meta-analysis reveals that the odds of receiving a severe sanction is approximately
42% higher for a Black defendant even after controlling for prior record and other legal and
extralegal variables” (Stolzenberg, 2013, p.1). With full discretion of charging decisions and
subsequent sentencing sanctions, the prosecutor has been the actor responsible for inconsistent,
disproportionate sanctions of Black defendants.
By implementing a blind charging system, the defendant’s personal information remains
unknown in the initial case files and reports that are sent to the prosecutor. This proposed
solution aims to ensure the charging patterns of the prosecutor are not guided by biases of race,
gender, age, sexuality, etc. Blind charging works to address prosecutorial power and discretion
by holding the prosecutor accountable for extreme, and especially racially motivated, charging
patterns and behaviors that in turn, lead to unfair and often inconsistent sentencing lengths for
minority defendants.
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Eliminate Prosecutorial Discretion
This particular solution exists as a way to control prosecutorial power in an effort to
reduce incarceration. Of all solutions, this is the most extreme option to reduce incarceration by
limiting prosecutorial power. The discretion of the prosecutor is applied at every stage of the
criminal justice process. From the initial decision to charge to the final sentencing
recommendation, the prosecutor employs discretion throughout pretrial, trial and post-trial
proceedings and especially throughout the plea negotiation process. Their discretion is almost
limitless. In an effort to reduce prosecutorial misconduct and abuse within the system, this
solution is offered to control the discrepancies and biases in discretion by eliminating it
altogether.
Abolish Plea Bargaining
Another popular proposed solution to this problem is to end the practice of plea
bargaining altogether. Indeed, many examples of abuse and inconsistencies in prosecutorial
discretion are rooted in the plea bargaining process. This process requires a defendant to forego
their constitutional rights and it not only allows, but encourages, the innocent to be sentenced to
incarceration. Steven Schulhofer, professor of law at New York University, explains his support
of abolishing plea bargaining in his 1992 research study, “Plea Bargaining as Disaster.”
Schulhofer writes, “plea agreements defeat the public interest in effective law enforcement at the
same time that they deny defendants the benefits of a vigorous defense and inflict undeserved
punishment on innocents who could win acquittal at trial” (Schulhofer, 1992, p. 2009).
The primary support for this solution lies in the idea that this process has created more
problems for our criminal justice system than it has solved. This, paired with the fact that
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scholars estimate more than ninety percent of all federal and state cases currently being handled
in our criminal legal system are settled by a plea bargaining agreement, has led scholars to argue
for the abolishment of the practice altogether in an effort to restore the damage and
inconsistencies of our justice system (Devers, 2011). To abolish plea bargaining would mean the
negotiating and coercive powers of the prosecutor are nearly removed from the justice system
entirely, ideally restoring a fair and just trial process for all defendants. Further, abolishing plea
bargaining directly reduces and controls the number of convicted criminals entering carceral
facilities.
Eliminate Cash Bail System
Abolishing state cash bail policies works to eliminate any pretrial detention of defendants
awaiting trial. Prosecutors often are incentivized by pretrial detention in negotiating their plea
deals. For example, people held in carceral facilities pretrial are more likely to plead guilty in an
effort to spend less time in prison rather than taking their chances at a more severe charge
carrying a longer sentence (Onyekwere, 2019). This works to explain why those who are held
pretrial are four times more likely than those who are not to be sentenced to prison (Onyekwere,
2019). As such, abolishing this scenario altogether directly limits the prosecutor’s power to
coerce pretrial detainees into rushing into a guilty plea.
Further, eliminating cash bail policies immediately releases several defendants being held
in carceral facilities before ever being determined guilty. A 2019 study conducted by the Prison
Policy Initiative discovered that “more than 555,000 people are locked up who haven’t even
been convicted or sentenced” (Wagner and Sawyer, 2020). Several states have recently decided
to reform their cash bail policies on the grounds of prison and jail overcrowding such as
Kentucky, New Jersey, New Mexico, Illinois, and Indiana. As of 2020, New York and California
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were the only states to pass laws completely eliminating pretrial detention and cash bail systems;
since then, Illinois, Nebraska, Indiana have further reformed their systems (RED, 2021). In 2018,
California reformed their cash bail system to eliminate bail for any defendant who could not
afford it (California Does Away With Cash Bail For Those Who Can't Afford It, 2021). New
York has eliminated cash bail for most, but not all, misdemeanor charges as well as non-violent
felonies (Hoylman, 2022).

Phase One: Effectiveness
To measure the effectiveness of these proposals, one must apply both indicators of
effectiveness to all eight solutions. The first indicator is determining that the solution in question
limits prosecutorial power in a reasonable way. The second indicator of effectiveness is then to
determine whether or not this solution would sufficiently reduce incarceration. The latter
indicator can be best understood by limiting the number of bodies going into carceral facilities
and/ or releasing the number of bodies currently incarcerated. There is not a specific numerical
unit of bodies that must be reached by each proposal. Rather, the measurement being used is a
threshold sufficiently large enough. If the proposed solutions pass both indicators of
effectiveness, they will then advance to be measured in terms of feasibility. If not, the solutions
are discarded and will not be recommended in the following chapter. Two solutions fail to
appropriately limit the power and discretion of the prosecutor, one solution fails to sufficiently
reduce incarceration rates, and five solutions have been determined effective.
Pretrial Diversion programs surely reduce the number of individuals entering carceral
facilities. Mississippi allows pretrial diversion programs as an alternative to incarceration. Under
Mississippi law, qualifying defendants must be first time offenders with a non-violent charge
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(Pre-trial diversion program, n.d.). This policy includes several imprisonable offenses including
drug possession charges. To put this into perspective, in 2019 nearly 1.5 million drug arrests
were made in the U.S. (U.S. Department of Justice, 2020). Of those, 86.7% (or roughly 1.3
million) were for simple possession of a controlled substance (U.S. Department of Justice, 2020).
If the federal government were to implement pretrial diversion programs mirroring that of the
state of Mississippi, all first-time offenders incarcerated for drug possession in 2019 would have
been prevented from ever entering a carceral facility. While it has been outlined in a previous
chapter that removing individuals with drug charges alone from carceral facilities does not solve
mass incarceration, a pretrial diversion program implemented to hinder nonviolent offenders
(with drug charges and more) from ever entering these facilities would reach a threshold of
incarceration prevention much larger than drug charges alone.
This policy proposal is effective in terms of incarceration because it directly reduces the
number of bodies entering carceral facilities. In terms of prosecutorial power, pretrial diversion
programs affect the prosecutor by easing their case load burden and allowing them to redirect
judicial resources to violent offenders. While these programs directly affect the prosecutor, they
do not do so in a way that limits their powers. Indeed, this option actually expands their powers.
However, it is worthy to note this is a positive addition to prosecutorial power and discretion and
has proven potential for success in reducing incarceration. The issue as it relates to this thesis, is
that it does not address the prosecutor by limiting or controlling any existing power. As such,
the pretrial diversion programs fail to pass both indicators of effectiveness.
Similarly, the proposed policy solution to eliminate prosecutorial power and discretion
altogether does not pass the effectiveness phase. Completely eliminating the powers of the
prosecutor is not reasonably limiting their power and discretion. While often problematic,
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prosecutorial power is necessary for our justice system to work. Angela Davis, famous author
and political activist, is largely known for her work in fervently opposing abuse in prosecutorial
power. Even so, she understands the importance of discretion in the American justice system,
writing, “As a part of the executive branch of government, it is the prosecutor's duty to enforce
the laws, and it would be virtually impossible to perform this essential function without
exercising discretion” (Davis, 2009, p.13). Discretion allows prosecutors to decide which cases
are worthy of a trial and which cases lack the evidence necessary to go through with the judicial
process. When used correctly, prosecutorial discretion allows the scarce judicial resources to be
used for cases that need them and also provides for mercy in a system that is too often “harsh and
impersonal” (Brownstein, 2003). It is important to note that this is an area of research known as
conceptual space. While this has been mentioned as a solution and heavily debated by scholars,
there is no data or research on what the criminal justice system would look like without
prosecutorial discretion. Abolishing discretion altogether would not be an effective solution to
properly address the issues at hand. Subsequently, that solution was also dismissed.
Blind Charging is yet another proposed solution that fails to pass the effectiveness phase.
Blind-Charging is effective in limiting the scope and powers of the prosecutors by controlling
inconsistencies in sanctioning and charging patterns especially for minority offenders. In terms
of incarceration, however, prosecutorial charging patterns did not produce significant differences
in charging patterns.
According to a report by the Stanford Computational Policy Lab, charging decisions
actually increased when the file excluded a defendants’ personal information. This study divided
charging decisions into two parts: decisions made from an initial report that redacted personal
information such as race, class, age, and sex, and decisions that were made final after this
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information was given to the prosecutor. Results conclude that prosecutors were more likely to
charge based on the color-blind file at 68% charged than the final report with just 57% charged
(Chohlas-Wood, et al., 2021). This indicates that color-blind charging may actually have adverse
effects on incarceration rates.
The Stanford Policy report indicates the higher likelihood in charging could be a result of
a number of hypotheses. The first being that prosecutors may act more punitively when
information is redacted or hidden from them, this is explained as the “de-personalization effect”
(Chohlas-Wood, et al., 2021). Alternatively, another explanation produced by the same study
suggests that prosecutors may “overestimate the likelihood that the full, unredacted case files
would contain incriminating evidence” (Chohlas-Wood, et al., 2021). While color-blind charging
algorithms are relatively new and more concrete information will be available in the coming
years, the information and studies that are available now conclude these policies are not effective
at limiting charging patterns of prosecutors. They often result in increased charges, and since
increased charging results in increased incarceration, this proposed solution must be dismissed.
While these three solutions have been discarded, five remain effective. Restricting the
Federal Joinder, Abolishing Plea Bargaining, Expanding Brady v. Maryland, Independent
Reviews and Cash-Bail Reform all work to sufficiently reduce incarceration rates and also limit
the power and discretion of the prosecutor reasonably and appropriately. Abolishing pleabargaining places the strongest limit on prosecutorial power. Considering the negotiating powers
exhibited over defendants’ during plea negotiations, abolishing the practice altogether
dramatically addresses any abuse in prosecutorial discretion as it relates to plea deals. Abolishing
plea bargaining does not work to release those already incarcerated. Even so, the scope of plea
bargaining on current increasing rates of imprisonment is vast. Indeed, abolishing plea deals
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altogether would work to dramatically limit the number of individuals entering carceral facilities,
preventing future increases in incarceration.
Restricting the Federal Joinder, Expanding Brady v. Maryland and Cash-Bail Reform are
similar in the ways they work to limit the coercive powers of the prosecutor during pretrial and
trial proceedings. A 2019 study on pretrial detention suggests that pretrial detention is an
incredibly powerful tool for prosecutors (Petersen, 2020). “Survival analyses indicate that
pretrial detainees plead guilty 2.86 times faster than released defendants do” (Petersen, 2020,
p.1). With prosecutors responsible for requesting to set bail, pretrial detention works in their
favor. Prosecutors are incentivized to request to set bail as it helps them negotiate a speedy plea
that will end in conviction. If cash-bail policies were reformed, however, prosecutors would lose
coercive powers in terms of influencing a conviction and also lose discretion in their ability to
request that a judge set bail for individual cases. Similarly, expanding Brady v Maryland to apply
in plea bargaining deals as well, means prosecutors would then be required to disclose
exculpatory evidence in plea negotiations. This expansion of a defendant’s rights would
adequately limit the power and discretion of the prosecutor especially as it relates to their current
control over plea deals.
Restricting the Federal Joinder also limits negotiating powers of the prosecutor by
reducing the number of charges that can be stacked against a defendant, a tool primarily used to
influence longer sentence lengths. All three solutions are similar in the way they limit pretrial
powers of the prosecutor. Restricting the Federal Joinder reduces their pretrial charging powers
by limiting their ability to stack multiple charges for the same or similar crimes. Expanding
Brady v Maryland restricts their coercive abilities in plea bargaining by directly taking away the
prosecutorial power to withhold and ignore exculpatory evidence during pretrial plea
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negotiations. Finally, reforming the cash bail system works to take away any chance of pretrial
detention which works in favor of the prosecutors. By removing this prosecutorial bargaining
tool, the pretrial powers of the prosecutors are once again limited.
With negotiating powers reduced, convictions and guilty pleas are less likely and
significantly harder to obtain. A decrease in convictions and plea deals does not release those
already incarcerated, but it does sufficiently reduce the bodies entering carceral facilities. As
such, these three solutions pass both measurement indicators and are deemed effective.
Finally, Independent Reviews are another effective accountability measure over
prosecutors. This system of reviews works to ensure any inconsistencies in charging and
sentencing are addressed regularly. This biannual accountability measure limits prosecutorial
discretion. When prosecutors know their charging patterns and decisions will be analyzed and
compared within the department regularly, they are less likely to abuse their power in fear of
losing their job. While the review itself does not work to take away any specific prosecutorial
power, this proposal still remains effective as the prosecutors limit their own discretion and
abuse. Baughman explains that added accountability measures lead to more cautious, or
conservative, charging behaviors. Fewer and milder charging tendencies lead to shorter
sentencing which in turn controls the number of individuals entering the carceral state and the
amount of time spent there. As such, Independent Reviews are deemed effective at limiting
prosecutorial power and discretion and controlling long-term incarceration rates.

Phase Two: Feasibility
With five solutions left, the two indicators of feasibility work to further screen the
proposed policy solutions. The first indicator of feasibility is whether or not the proposal will be
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politically feasible. That is, what are the odds this solution will be implemented or lead to
legislation being passed? The second indicator is economic feasibility, concerned with general
costs and funding. As with the first phase, any solution that fails to pass both indicators of
feasibility will be discarded. The remaining solutions that have been determined effective and
feasible will undergo a final screening for ethical implications. One solution fails to be
economically feasible and another solution fails to be politically feasible. Three of the initial
eight proposals are determined to be feasible by these two indicators and will be further screened
for ethical implications.
Abolishing the plea bargaining process would arguably be the most immediate and
effective way to limit prosecutorial power. However, the plea system is vast and nearly all
encompassing. Over ninety-five percent of all criminal convictions, both state and federal, result
from plea bargaining rather than trial. Prosecutors and public defenders alike cannot handle
current case-loads even as the majority of their work is currently handled by plea negotiations.
For example, a recent study by the American Bar Association (ABA) found Louisiana public
defenders have a workload five times the workload needed to be considered “adequate defense”
(Weiss, 2019). Jack Talaska, public defender in Lafayette, Louisiana was assigned to 194 felony
cases at once back in 2017. Colorado, Missouri and Rhode Island defenders carry two to three
times the workload they should (Weiss, 2019).
The Constitution guarantees all defendants in a criminal court the right to “adequate
defense,” but in today’s criminal system the defense counsel is almost always inadequate due to
burdens in case load and insufficient time to properly handle them. One lawyer assigned 194
felony cases is not adequate counsel, even in a world where plea bargaining still exists. To
abolish the practice of plea bargaining would surely bring the justice system to a halt. Our
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criminal courts are not equipped to handle current cases much less the sheer number of trials and
cases that would take place immediately following the abolishment of plea bargaining as a
practice. Plea bargaining is in need of reform, and abolishment may be a possible solution at
some point, but in today’s climate and system of criminalization, this solution is not a feasible
option. As such, abolishing plea bargaining has been discarded.
On the other hand, Independent Reviews are not economically feasible. This program
would be effective and beneficial in terms of accountability and checked power over elected
officials who have a direct incentive in remaining “tough on crime.” However, these programs
will cost significant money to start, requiring oversight committees be formed at the local, state
and federal levels. The operational costs of biannual review boards in every district in every state
will require significant funding. As this is an accountability measure to control the charging and
sentencing habits of prosecutors, the district offices themselves will likely be unwilling to pay
the costs. Until there is a study on economic costs or implications of these independent reviews,
it is reasonable to assume it unlikely for states or district attorneys’ offices to fund the oversight
committees necessary for these independent reviews to take place. As of now, this is not an
economically feasible policy solution and must be discarded. Three solutions remain.
Two solutions are very similar in terms of feasibility as they both directly relate to
procedures of the Supreme Court of The United States. To restrict the Federal Joinder will
require amending the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. To do so includes a process granted
by the Rules Enabling Act that gives the deciding authority to the Supreme Court (Pending rules
and forms amendments, n.d.). This process begins with a preliminary draft considered by the
standing committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure and ends with a final adoption of the new
rules by the Supreme Court (Congressional Research Service, 2020). The process can take three
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years, but is a relatively common practice. Indeed, the last amendment to the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure was made in 2019 (Current rules of practice & procedure, n.d.). Amending
criminal procedure is politically feasible.
Amending criminal procedure is also economically feasible. While the process is lengthy,
the cost is relatively straightforward. As it must go before the Supreme Court there is an
automatic $300.00 docket fee that must be paid, along with additional charges and fees that will
be required before the rules are successfully amended. There is no set cost for this process. Each
amendment or addition to the rules carries unique circumstances, legal fees and time frames.
These are three factors that help determine overall court costs especially when filed with the
Supreme Court. Considering the relatively common practice of amending the rules of criminal
procedure, it is reasonable to believe the costs do not hinder the likelihood of legislation being
passed or amended.
Similarly, to expand Brady v Maryland will also require the oversight of the Supreme
Court. “Brady” was decided in 1963 by the Supreme Court. As most decisions of the Supreme
Court are final, there are only two ways to alter the original decision: a constitutional amendment
or a new ruling of the Court (The court and constitutional interpretation, n.d.) The former is
extremely rare and complicated by nature. The latter, however, is feasible. The Court can and has
overturned their previous decisions. While it is relatively uncommon, the instances in which the
Supreme Court overturns its original decision are due largely to new cases in which the same
constitutional issue is heard again but this time in a new light, whether that be due to changing
social or political environments or factors.
With Brady, the original decision was made to protect defendants’ rights during criminal
trials in a time where plea bargaining was relatively uncommon and trials were how the majority
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of criminal cases were decided. If this case were heard today in a justice system overrun by plea
deals, the Supreme Court would surely ensure defendants “finally receive the constitutional
protections Brady was created to safeguard” (Grossman, 2016).
In terms of political feasibility, there are several scholars and activists alike supporting
the expansion of Brady. Their support provides a much greater influence on public opinion for
this issue. As an example, in her book Arbitrary Justice, Angela Davis alludes to a solution like
this in explaining possible reforms to the plea-bargaining process (Davis, 2009). She writes,
“The prosecutor should reveal the weaknesses in her case and inform the defendant of
information that is helpful to the defense...,” adding that this reform would “provide more
fairness and balance to the process” (Davis, 2009, p.58-59). As a famous activist and leading
scholar in criminal justice reform and prosecutorial misconduct, Davis’ support in a reform of
this magnitude will be key in the political feasibility of a new ruling of the Supreme Court.
Economically, a new Court ruling will require significant legal fees and court costs, but
the price in this case does not render the solution unfeasible. Precedent shows us that if a case is
worthy of a new ruling, people are willing to pay the fees. Over 230 rulings of the Supreme
Court have been successfully overturned regardless of economic factors (Congress.gov, n.d.).
Indeed, there is reason to believe the price tag does not jeopardize the outcome of this proposed
solution. As such, both Restricting the Federal Joinder and expanding Brady v. Maryland,
through processes within the Supreme Court, are deemed politically and economically feasible
and will undergo the final screening for ethical implications.
The final solution to pass the feasibility phase is ending the cash bail system. This is a
policy issue becoming increasingly popular among state legislators. Since 2018, seven states
have reformed their cash bail systems and Illinois became the first state to pass legislation that
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will eliminate their cash bail system by 2023 (Cramer, 2021). There are several activist
organizations and celebrity endorsements surrounding the elimination of cash bail that aid in its
political feasibility. These movements have caught the attention and support of the American
Civil Liberties Union and Color of Change, and have even caught the endorsement of celebrities
such as John Legend and Jay-Z (Ganeva, 2019). The movement to end cash bail is growing
quickly due to the influence of certain groups and celebrities casting light on the socioeconomic
burdens of bail. Cash bail systems undoubtedly criminalize poverty.
In 2015, the death of Kalief Browder heightened the movement to end cash bail and shed
light on the reality of bail systems criminalizing the families underserved by society. Browder
was held in Rikers Island jail complex for three years awaiting his trial because his family was
unable to pay his bail (NYTimes, 2015). Browder, arrested at 16 for allegedly stealing a
backpack, was placed in solitary confinement for nearly two of his three years in Rikers Island
(NYTimes, 2015). In court, all charges against him were dropped and Browder was released in
2013. However, the mental toll that his time in solitary confinement took on him paired with the
physical abuse he endured by guards inside the jail center, led an innocent Browder to take his
own life by 2015. The story of Kalief Browder has sparked the nationwide desire for cash bail
reform and abolishment. TIME released a documentary on the case of Kalief Browder and
Netflix has since released the documentary on their platform.
All of these efforts and events that have taken place in the past decade have only worked
in favor of political feasibility for ending cash bail. States have begun reforming their systems
and as of last year, states are beginning to eliminate their systems altogether. Ending the cash
bail system is not only economically feasible, but economically beneficial. A 2021 report
released by the Brookings Institute discovered, “Reducing pretrial detention from 38 percent (the
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figure for felony defendants in 2009) to 10 percent—through reforms such as the elimination of
cash bail—would produce substantial economic benefits” (Dobbie and Yang, 2021). They
estimate that these reforms could lead to over 2.8 million individuals being prevented from
entering prisons, jails or other carceral facilities as part of their pretrial detention (Dobbie and
Yang, 2021). With prison and jail overcrowding and lack of funding being such large financial
burdens on state budgets, eliminating cash bail in an effort to remove nearly 3 million people
from carceral facilities is in the economic interest of every state. As such, eliminating cash bail
remains effective and feasible both politically and economically.
Ending cash bail, expanding the protections of Brady v Maryland and restricting the
Federal Joinder of Charges are the three proposed solutions that will be screened for ethical
implications in an effort to obtain distributive justice. The solution(s) that pass the final phase
will be recommended in the next chapter as the strongest solution(s) to reduce mass incarceration
through limiting the power and discretion of the American prosecutor.

Phase Three: Ethical Implications
With just three of the original eight proposals left, the ethical screening works as a final
measurement to narrow down the strength of the solutions in terms of fairness. With a strong
focus on distributive justice, this phase is concerned with limiting incarceration not just by the
number of people, but the concentration of those people and the nature of their crimes. Applying
John Rawls’ Veil of Ignorance will remove cognitive biases and ensure impartiality of judgment
in deciding what is fair in an ideal society (Freeman, 2019). Again, the Veil of Ignorance is a
practice that helps to determine the fairness of policies or recommendations.
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One key aspect of the Veil of Ignorance is Rawls Difference Principle. “The Difference
Principle permits diverging from strict equality so long as the inequalities in question would
make the least advantaged in society materially better off than they would be under strict
equality” (Lamont & Favor, 2017).The Difference Principle tells us that if there is any
disadvantage of equality within the three solutions left, it must, at minimum, be advantageous for
the very worst off in our society. Rawls includes the Difference Principle to say that inequalities
are permissible, but only when they work to raise the level of the most vulnerable (Lamont &
Favor, 2017).
This thesis is concerned not only with reducing incarceration to a controllable level but
also in reducing the racial inequalities in patterns of incarceration rates. As such, the Difference
Principle will be a necessary tool to focus on not just removing people from carceral facilities,
but specifically removing minority offenders who disproportionately fill our carceral facilities by
raising them to the level of incarceration held by those already advantaged by society. If the
solution seems generally unequal for all offenders or individuals in society, or is only
advantageous for those already advantaged by society, then it will be discarded.
Expanding Brady v Maryland works to ensure prosecutors are considering and disclosing
potentially exculpatory evidence in plea negotiations. As of now, there is no safeguard in place
that ensures defendants’ rights are upheld in plea deals because Brady v Maryland only applies
in court. This expansion of defendants’ rights would prevent prosecutors from knowingly and
wrongfully convicting the innocent. Both plea bargaining as a practice and wrongful convictions
disproportionately impact Black defendants. The National Registry of Exonerations reported in
2017 that Black people are seven times more likely to face a wrongful conviction for murder
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than white people (Gross, 2017). Moreover, well over half of all death row exonerees since 1973
have been Black (Death Penalty Information Center, 2020).
When the veil of ignorance is applied to this policy solution, those situated in the original
position are unaware of their race or social status and unable to determine how they personally
would be impacted by this policy. As such, policymakers are likely to determine this expansion
as a fair policy option due to its focus on expanding all defendants’ rights to be upheld in plea
negotiating and alleviating wrongful convictions. This would be an effective, feasible, and
ethically sound policy option for everyone in society. As such, expanding Brady v Maryland will
be recommended in the following chapter.
Cash bail, on the other hand, has too long criminalized poverty. Three out of every five
people housed in U.S. jails today are legally innocent of their crime but unable to pay their bail
(Hunter, 2020). This means over 500,000 individuals are incarcerated not based on the severity
of the crime they may or may not have committed, but because they are unable to afford their
bail and remain detained in carceral facilities until their trial. By abolishing the cash bail system,
those underserved by society are given the same chance as those who could previously afford
their bail to be released until their set court date.
In terms of the Veil of Ignorance, if policymakers did not know their social status,
socioeconomic status, or demographics behind the Veil of Ignorance, they would likely say that
ending cash bail is a fair policy. Not only is this an equal policy option from behind the Veil of
Ignorance, but it directly advantages those who could not previously afford bail and would have
been incarcerated until their trial. As mentioned in an earlier section, pretrial detention works in
favor of the prosecutors as it can help coerce individuals into signing a guilty plea deal just to be
released from carceral facilities or to serve a shorter sentence than the prosecutor convinces them
60

they would receive otherwise. Cash bail incarcerates the poor before ever being convicted. As
such, this system works to criminalize the socioeconomic status of the individual rather than the
crime they may or may not have committed. Removing the system is fair for all those in society
regardless of their ability to afford bail. This is an ethically sound policy solution and will also be
recommended in the following chapter.
Similarly, restricting the Federal Joinder will be an ethical solution to addressing
prosecutorial power and discretion in an effort to reduce incarceration. A 2015 study by
Vanderbilt Law Review examined charging patterns over a five-year period concluding those
who faced multiple charges in court under the joinder of offenses, were much more likely to
receive a conviction and face incarceration (Leipold & Abbasi, 2019). According to this study,
findings over the same five-year period also revealed that “the joinder effect of counts was more
pronounced in bench trials than in jury trials” ... also concluding these bench trials to be
disproportionately misdemeanors and public order crimes (Leipold & Abbasi, 2019, p.384).
Misdemeanor offenses in our justice system carry significant racial disparities in convictions and
sentencing.
A 2017 study published by Loyola Law School analyzed over 30,000 Wisconsin cases
over a seven-year period (Berdejó, 2017). Results reveal that white offenders facing a
misdemeanor charge were nearly seventy-five percent more likely to have that charge reduced or
dropped than Black offenders (Berdejó, 2017). Further, White defenders with no criminal history
were over forty-five percent more likely than similarly situated Black defendants to have those
charges reduced or dropped carrying no potential imprisonment (Berdejó, 2017). This
information is especially useful when the joinder of offenses more often affects misdemeanor
and public order offenses, disproportionately targeting and imprisoning defendants of color. As
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such, to restrict the federal joinder would directly assist the populations currently disadvantaged
by its application.
Again, behind the Veil of Ignorance, individuals (policymakers, in this case) would not
know their demographics, social status, or socioeconomic status. Consequently, this policy
option would be a fair proposal as it offers a more equal outcome in court for everyone. This
option is more advantageous for the Black community currently being disproportionately
affected by the joinder of offenses, especially in misdemeanor cases. However, the Difference
Principle tells us that this “inequality” is not only permissible but encouraged as it raises the
previously disadvantaged to the same standard as those who are better off in society and in our
justice system. Restricting the Federal Joinder is the final solution that passes all three phases:
effectiveness, feasibility, and ethical implications.
The results of applying my methodology to the eight solutions are summarized in Figure
4, which shows the results of all three phases of research.
FIGURE 4: Summary of Findings
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Because three solutions (restricting the Federal Joinder, expanding Brady v. Maryland,
and eliminating the cash bail system) passed all three phases, they will be further outlined and
recommended in the following chapter, along with examining the limitations of this research and
outlining areas for future research.
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CHAPTER 5: RESULTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The application chapter revealed three possible policy routes to control prosecutorial
power in such a way that sufficiently reduces overincarceration. These three policy reforms
include ending the cash bail system, restricting the Federal Joinder, and expanding the provisions
granted under Brady v. Maryland. All three have successfully been screened for their
effectiveness, feasibility and morality.
At the outset of this research, the desired goal was to recommend the strongest solution
that would reduce current rates of incarceration by controlling prosecutorial misconduct and
abuse. While three possible solutions was not the foreseen outcome, and while these policies
were each evaluated individually, perhaps the three recommendations together, addressing both
short-term and long-term rates of incarceration, will have a more amplified effect on the criminal
justice system. As such, I recommend all three proposed solutions.
The elimination of cash-bail will have the most immediate, short-term reduction in
incarceration, immediately releasing more than 500,000 individuals from carceral facilities. This
is arguably the most ethical solution as it is most concerned with distributive justice and easing
the discrimination and criminalization of the poor. Further, of all three solutions, eliminating
cash bail has garnered the most public support, increasing its political feasibility and influence.
While it will not have a long-term impact on keeping incarceration rates lowered, it will release a
number of individuals sufficiently large enough to make a short-term difference. Ending cash
bail has promising potential for limiting the powers of the prosecutor in a way that directly and
immediately reduces incarceration.
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Restricting the Federal Joinder will perhaps have the strongest impact on controlling the
coercive and negotiating powers of the prosecutor. Joining charges of same or similar character
to simply increase their negotiating power over a defendant in an effort to more quickly reach a
conviction is an abuse of prosecutorial power. The restriction specifically focused on charges of
“same or similar character” will work to prevent this prosecutorial misconduct that often leads
directly to longer sentences than the crime alone carries. By focusing on only one aspect of the
Federal Joinder, this solution is a more conservative approach to reforming criminal procedure.
In comparison to eliminating the rule altogether, this cautious proposal is more likely to gain
political support. It also has the power to prevent a number of defendants from being coerced
into signing a plea deal, preventing these innocent individuals from ever entering the carceral
facility they otherwise would have. While it will not work in the short-term like cash bail
elimination, this solution will instead have a more consistent, long-term decrease in incarceration
rates as it not only addresses the numbers entering carceral facilities but reduces the lengths of
their sentences as well.
Expanding the provisions of Brady v. Maryland is the final policy recommendation to
alleviate the U.S. overincarceration problem by limiting the power of the American prosecutor.
Supreme Court Justice Anthony M. Kennedy once said, “Criminal justice today is for the most
part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.” He continues, “The right to adequate assistance of
counsel cannot be defined or enforced without taking account of the central role plea bargaining
takes in securing convictions and determining sentences” (Liptak, 2012). The provisions and
protections granted under Brady v Maryland in 1963 go unanswered in today’s justice system
because the system fails to take into account the role of plea bargaining as Justice Kennedy once
warned.
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In order to continually grant the Constitutional rights and protections of every defendant,
our justice system has to first adapt from a legal system of trial-only protections to plea
protections as well. Expanding the promises of Brady to be upheld in plea negotiations will
ensure that every defendant is given a fair and adequate defense. This expansion prevents future
wrongful convictions of the innocent as defendants are now legally protected and informed of
any and all exculpatory evidence the prosecutor has, preventing any coercion into guilty pleas,
incarceration, and dramatically longer sentences than necessary.
Working in tandem with one another, these policy reforms dually work as accountability
measures for prosecutorial misconduct and abuse of power as well as reducing incarceration for
those who do not deserve incarceration or do not deserve the lengths they have been given. The
combination of short and long-term solutions will likely have the far-reaching impact that is
necessary for an incarceration problem of this magnitude.
Limitations and Areas of Future Research
Notably, the research into reducing mass incarceration by an avenue of addressing
prosecutorial power and discretion is a fairly new area scholars and activists alike have given
their attention to. As such, several of these policy proposals were proposed between 2019-2021.
The availability of research is a limitation as these proposals are still developing. For example,
several solutions lacked economic analysis and public opinion polls as they were first published
less than one year ago. It will take time to further develop more necessary information which is
why it is important to note these are the solutions available now and these are recommendations
based on the academic research available now. If more information becomes available in coming
months and years, the methodology of this research will stay the same but the results may
change. For example, solutions that were discarded because they lacked economic feasibility
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may one day be feasible. Likewise, solutions that are politically feasible in today’s climate may
not be in future years, and would again need to be processed through these same three phases and
indicators: effectiveness, feasibility, ethical implications. This area of future research is where
the ethical implications will be crucial. While the remaining solutions made it to the final phase
of ethical implications, others that were previously discarded did not. If the discarded policies
were otherwise effective and feasible and hypothetically made it to the final phase of ethical
implications, it is important to note they may not have passed. Ensuring the proposed solutions
and policy recommendations are ethically sound and aimed at distributive justice will not only
reduce incarceration by numbers alone but the concentration and discriminatory patterns of who
is incarcerated as well.
Other limitations of this research include condensed time frame for research and
publication and limitations to specific solutions. For example, the study referenced for blind
charging was only from the state of California over a narrow period of time. If tested with a
larger sample, over an extended period of time, the results could vary and it could move forward
through the phases. Further, another limitation of this research is that Brady violations are the
most common form of prosecutorial misconduct in trial (Davis, 2009). Even if the provisions
were expanded to plea negotiations, one must understand that prosecutorial misconduct of Brady
violations will still take place - just as they currently do in trial proceedings.
Areas for future research include further details on independent review boards,
specifically as it relates to operations and funding. Thorough economic analysis of not only
independent reviews but pretrial diversion and blind-charging would be helpful to this research.
Blind-charging did not make it to the feasibility phase but even if it had, the information on
financial analysis was not available. A final area of future research that could strengthen this
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thesis would be analyzing the political feasibility of Supreme Court cases. Sans public opinion
and the opinion of Justices, information on factors that influence the likelihood of overturning
Supreme Court cases would be beneficial. For example, grass-roots marketing and social media
strategies can only influence public opinion, so when it becomes a matter of constitutionality,
what are the factors that increase political feasibility of the Supreme Court process?
The areas for future research are vast. This is a realm of academia that is relatively new.
Prosecutorial misconduct has been explored for several years, and overincarceration in the
United States has extensive research and data to support it. However, it is the combination of the
two, reducing incarceration by limiting prosecutorial misconduct, that has received relatively
recent attention and policy research.
Conclusion
The growth of the incarcerated population in America has been explosive over the past
four decades alone. Prison overcrowding, lack of funding, inhumane living conditions and
human rights violations are all problems stemming directly from unsustainable rates of
incarceration. Addressing the incarceration problem in America has to be a priority for true
criminal justice reform. To effectively do so will require addressing the one actor with near
limitless power, discretion and control of the American carceral state: the prosecutor.
For years, the leading cause of mass incarceration has been heavily debated and yet none
worked to explain the period of rising incarceration rates during a time of decreasing crime. The
prosecutor is the one actor responsible for the decision to charge, what charges will be brought
against the defendant, how many charges will be brought against the defendant, how they can
coerce defendants into guilty pleas, and what the terms of their sentence lengths will be. While
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other factors of mass incarceration such as the war on drugs and mandatory minimums certainly
help explain how we got here overtime, the power and discretion of the American prosecutor
explains how we’ve stayed here.
Currently, there are eight policy proposals aimed at specifically addressing the role and
misconduct of the prosecutors in an effort to directly reduce incarceration. This thesis was aimed
at designing and applying a framework to narrow down these existing proposed solutions in such
a way that would leave us with the strongest policy proposal. Three solutions passed all three
phases and indicators of effectiveness, feasibility, and ethics. As such, all three have been
recommended as areas for promising reform. While other solutions may still be possible,
eliminating cash bail systems, expanding Brady v Maryland and restricting the Federal Joinder of
charges should be prioritized, as these are the most effective, feasible, and ethically-sound
solutions that aim to address the power and control of the American prosecutor in an effort to
reduce mass incarceration.
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